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Delayed Flights and Delayed
Action:  The U.S. Department
of Transportation’s Tarmac
Delay Regulations and Their
Impact on Air Travel
by Daniel Friedenzohn*
Introduction
The deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978 was based
on the idea that greater competition among airlines would benefit
consumers with lower fares and improved service.1  In general,
airline passengers experienced a decline in air fares, largely attrib-
utable to the increase in competition.2  The enactment of the pol-
icy resulted in a 55 percent increase in passenger traffic during
the first decade.3
Increased competition and rising operating costs put tremen-
dous pressure on carriers.4  Between 2000 and 2009, U.S. passen-
ger airlines lost more than $45 billion.5  As a result, airlines are
continually looking for ways to reduce their costs and increase
* J.D., M.A., Economics.  Assistant Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University.  The author is grateful to his Department for
supporting research pertaining to the airline industry.  The author thanks Di-
ana Friedenzohn for editorial assistance.
1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-630, AIRLINE DEREGU-
LATION: REREGULATING THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY WOULD LIKELY RE-
VERSE CONSUMER BENEFITS AND NOT SAVE AIRLINE PENSIONS (2006).
2 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing
and Competition, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 389, 389 (1990).
3 KENNETH J. BUTTON, CATO INST., OPENING U.S. SKIES TO GLOBAL
AIRLINE COMPETITION 3 (1998).
4 MIT GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY PROGRAM: AIRLINE INDUSTRY OVER-
VIEW, http://web.mit.edu/airlines/analysis/analysis_airline_industry.html
(last visited June 10, 2013).
5 Rick Newman, How Airline Mergers Save an Industry – and May Even
Benefit Fliers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.us
news.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/02/14/how-airline-mergers-saved
-an-industryand-may-even-benefit-fliers. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-733, AIRLINE PASSENGER PROTECTIONS:
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178 Issues in Aviation Law and Policy [Vol. 13:1
revenue in order to survive in an extremely competitive environ-
ment.  Some of the cost reductions have at times impacted cus-
tomers in a negative way.
The airline industry’s customer service problems are often un-
derscored during flight delays, cancellations, and on-board de-
lays.  In 2007, 29 percent of all flights were cancelled or delayed,
affecting about 163 million passengers.6  The causes of these
flights’ disruptions were often due to factors over which the air-
lines had little or no control, such as weather, airspace congestion,
and airport capacity.  Airlines, however, often receive the most
criticism from the flying public in terms of how they fail to re-
spond to the needs of passengers during these situations.
Over the past 13 years, there have been several instances where
passengers have been stranded on airplanes on the ground at an
airport without being allowed to disembark.  In January 1999,
hundreds of passengers were grounded on aircraft operated by
Northwest Airlines for up to eight hours at the Detroit Metropoli-
tan Airport without the possibility of disembarking.7  Eight years
later, a similar incident involving JetBlue Airways occurred at
New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport.8  Both of
these situations highlighted the airline industry’s perceived in-
ability to address customers’ needs during long delays.
The manner in which the industry, government regulators, and
passengers have dealt with customer service issues related to de-
lays and cancellations in the U.S. is varied.  From a legal perspec-
tive, the traveling public has limited options in seeking judicial
relief under a theory of contract or tort law for many airline cus-
tomer service related issues.  Similarly, passengers are generally
prohibited from relying on state consumer protection laws to help
them obtain relief from airlines because the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enacting or enforcing
MORE DATA AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND EFFECTS OF
FLIGHT DELAYS (2011).
6 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STATUS REPORT ON
ACTIONS UNDERWAY TO ADDRESS FLIGHT DELAYS AND IMPROVE AIR-
LINE CUSTOMER SERVICE (2008) [hereinafter OIG STATUS REPORT 2008],
available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/WEB_FILE_
OIG_Statement_for_April_9_Hearing_correct.pdf.
7 David Josar, Joel Smith, & John Bacon, Storm Aftermath: Northwest
Blames Metro for Blizzard Breakdown: Thousands Stranded as Snow
Closed Runways, DET. NEWS, Jan. 5, 1999, at 1D.
8 See Jennifer 8. Lee, JetBlue Flight Snarls Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2007, at B7.
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laws that are related to the “price, route or service” of an air car-
rier.9  Finally, the airline industry’s attempt to create customer
service standards, while effective in some areas, has been mixed
and somewhat ineffective in dealing with cancellations as well as
flight delays.
The federal government, however, is in a unique and perhaps
the best position to address airline customer service issues.  First,
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has the responsi-
bility to act in the public interest in supporting the development
of a safe and efficient air transport system in this country.  Pursu-
ant to this mandate, the U.S. Congress and the DOT (including
the Federal Aviation Administration) have the authority to enact
statutes and regulations that address deficiencies in the aviation
system.  The DOT, itself, also has the authority to enforce those
laws.
Moreover, the federal government has oversight authority over
other aspects of commercial transportation that contribute to can-
cellations and delays, such as the National Airspace System and
aviation security.  Finally, because the Congress, in enacting the
ADA, limited passengers’ ability to take legal action against air-
lines, the federal government may have a greater obligation to
address these issues on behalf of the traveling public.10
Beginning in 2009, the DOT began the process of enacting a
series of new regulations designed to better address the needs of
airline passengers who are affected by service disruptions and/or
poor customer service.  The focus of this paper is on the DOT’s
so-called “tarmac rule.”  Part I provides an analysis of the limita-
tions that the ADA imposes on airline passengers who seek pri-
vate legal relief against a carrier for a delay or flight cancellation.
Part II provides an overview of the airline industry’s attempt to
address customer service issues during the late 1990s and early
2000s.  Part III discusses the few, yet widely publicized, instances
where individual airlines failed to handle tarmac delays in a cus-
tomer-friendly way, which resulted in attempts by various states
as well as the U.S. Congress to address tarmac delays beginning
in 2007.  Part IV addresses the DOT regulations that went into
effect beginning in 2010 and analyzes how effective they have
been in curbing long tarmac delays.  Part V provides an analysis
9 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1978).
10 See Statland v. American Airlines, 998 F.2d 539, 540–41 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993).
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of a number of consent orders that the DOT has entered into with
both domestic and international carriers to address tarmac rule
violations.
I. The Legal Protections Afforded to Airline Passengers Do Not
Provide Effective Relief to Address All Customer Service
Related Issues
Passengers flying on regularly scheduled airline service in the
United States are generally given rights and protections set forth
under statutes, regulations, and in certain instances, international
treaties.  Some of these rights, as well as further conditions, are
also provided in the airline’s contract of carriage.
A contract of carriage (also referred to as conditions of carriage
or tariff) is an agreement between an airline and its customer(s)
that identifies the duties and rights between the two parties.11
Contracts of carriage generally address rights and responsibilities
pertaining to many customer service related issues, including an
airline’s boarding policy (or situations that may warrant denial of
a passenger’s right to board), checked and carry-on baggage
rules, denied boarding compensation, and conditions of the car-
rier’s liability for flight delays and cancellations.  The terms set
forth in the contract of carriage are binding and enforceable by
both the passenger and an airline in a court of law.12
The existence of a contract between an airline and its passen-
gers does not necessarily mean that an appropriate legal frame-
work exists to ensure that passengers’ rights are being protected.
Contracts of carriage are “lengthy and complex documents that
anybody but a lawyer may find difficult to read.”13  Delta Air-
lines’ Domestic General Rules of Tariff (last modified May 25,
2012) for domestic U.S. service has over 22,000 words and is 51
pages long.14  It is highly unlikely that more than a few passen-
11 Fontan-de-Maldonado v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 936 F.2d 630
(1st Cir. 1991); Clemente v. Philippine Airlines, 614 F. Supp. 1196
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-99-281R,
COMPARISON OF AIRLINE ‘CUSTOMER SERVICE COMMITMENT’ WITH
CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE AND FEDERAL LAW (1999).
12 American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995).
13 James T. Yenckel, Just What Do the Airlines Owe You?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1991, at E1.
14 DELTA AIR LINES INC. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE: UNITED STATES, http://
www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/legal/contract-of-carriage-dgr.html
(last visited May 28, 2013).
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gers ever take the time to read the contract of carriage and/or any
of the associated rules pertaining to the ticket they purchased.15
Of equal concern is the fact that some passengers may not even
be given the opportunity to review a carrier’s conditions of car-
riage.  Some passengers, for example, may purchase a ticket via a
travel agency.  There is no law that requires these agencies to
“provide any notice of conditions of carriage in those
confirmations.”16
In addition to the complex language contained in most con-
tracts of carriage, carriers draft the documents to limit their expo-
sure in the event that something goes wrong.  In others, the
contract is specifically intended to ensure that passenger rights
under the agreement are restricted to the extent possible.17  Air-
line passengers often find that the contract of carriage “[r]ules
often work against them, not [the] airlines.”18  The private con-
tractual relationship that exists between an airline and its passen-
gers may not provide an effective means to address customer
service issues in the airline industry, including those related to
delays and cancellations.
II. A Few Well-Publicized Instances during the Late 1990s
Highlighted the Airline Industry’s Inability to
Effectively Address Flight Delays and Cancellations
In early January 1999, a snowstorm severely disrupted air
travel over much of the Midwestern section of the United States.
At that time, Northwest Airlines (which subsequently merged
with Delta Air Lines) maintained its largest hub at the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport.  As a result of the storm, Northwest can-
celled many departures from the airport.19  The carrier, however,
did not cancel all flights that were scheduled to arrive at the air-
port.  Consequently, many Northwest aircraft did not have a gate
15 Several courts, however, have ruled that conditions set forth in the con-
tract of carriage are binding on a passenger even if he or she is not aware
of them. Fontan-de-Maldonado, 936 F.2d 630; Valderama v. Delta Air
Lines, 931 F. Supp. 119 (D.P.R. 1996); Locks v. British Airways, 759 F.
Supp. 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
16 Mark Pestronk, Legal Briefs, TRAVEL WKLY. (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.
travelweekly.com/print.aspx?id=238084.
17 Yenckel, supra note 13, at E1.
18 Scott McCartney, When the Airlines Make the Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
2009, at 28.
19 Josar et al., supra note 7, at 1D.
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at which to park at when they landed.  Over 7,000 passengers
were forced to remain aboard their aircraft, some for more than
eight hours.20
Following hearings in late January 1999, both the U.S. Con-
gress and the DOT agreed to give an airline trade group, the Air
Transport Association (ATA, now known as Airlines for America,
or A4A), the opportunity to design a plan that would address the
policymakers’ concerns.  The industry enacted a voluntary “Air-
line Customer Service Commitment” in June 1999.21  Each ATA
member carrier was reported to have incorporated the Commit-
ment into its customer service operations by March 2000.22  The
plan included provisions that pledged to meet “passengers’ essen-
tial needs, including those during long, on-board delays.”23
Airline Customer Service Commitment
(June 1999)24
• Offer the lowest fare available [from the airline’s
telephone reservation system]
• Notify customers of known delays, cancellations
and diversions
• Provide on-time baggage delivery [return misdi-
rected bags within 24 hours]
• Support an increase in the lost baggage liability
limit
• Allow reservations to be held or canceled [for 24
hours]
• Provide prompt refunds [7 days for credit card;
20 days for cash]
• Properly accommodate disabled and special
needs passengers
• Meet customers’ essential needs during long on-
aircraft delays
• Handle “bumped” passengers with fairness and
consistency
20 OIG STATUS REPORT 2008, supra note 6.
21 Id.
22 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTERIM REPORT ON
AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE COMMITMENT (2000) [hereinafter OIG IN-
TERIM REPORT 2000], available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/
pdfdocs/av2000102.pdf.
23 OIG STATUS REPORT 2008, supra note 6.
24 OIG INTERIM REPORT 2000, supra note 22.
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• Disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies,
frequent flyer rules and aircraft configuration
• Ensure good customer service from code-share
partners
• Be more responsive to customer complaints.
The industry succeeded in meeting some of its obligations set
forth under its improvement plan.  Those areas included ensuring
that customers were always offered the lowest fare available at
the time of purchase and responding to customer complaints in a
timely manner.25  The Commitment did not effectively address
areas that were the “underlying causes of deep-seated customer
dissatisfaction – flights delays and cancellations.”26  In 2000, the
year that the airline industry’s initiative went into effect, “over 1
in 4 flights (27.5 percent) were delayed, canceled or diverted, af-
fecting approximately 163 million passengers.”27
The Commitment only pledged to “[m]eet customers’ essential
needs during long on-aircraft delays” without providing specific
details of how they would go about achieving that in certain situ-
ations.28  Although the industry experienced a reduction in arrival
delays in 2001, the DOT continued to express concerns about
how information regarding cancellations and delays was being
communicated to passengers.29
Despite some improvements in the system, airlines and their
customers continued to experience relatively high delay rates in
the U.S. aviation system throughout much of the last decade.
Data from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) in
Figure 1, infra, highlights by year the percentage of flights in the
U.S. that were cancelled, delayed, or diverted.30  While carriers
25 OIG STATUS REPORT 2008, supra note 6.
26 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FINAL REPORT ON
AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE COMMITMENT (2001) [hereinafter OIG FI-
NAL REPORT 2001], available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/
pdfdocs/av2001020.pdf.
27 Id.
28 OIG STATUS REPORT 2008, supra note 6.
29 Stephen Power & Jesse Drucker, Airline Group Cites Delays as Biggest
Headache, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2001, at A6; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, GAO-11-733, AIRLINE PASSENGER PROTECTIONS: MORE
DATA AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND EFFECTS OF FLIGHT DE-
LAYS (2011).
30 On-Time Performance – Flight Delays at a Glance, BUREAU OF TRANS.
STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/homedrillchart.asp (last visited
June 10, 2013).
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were not always responsible for the delays or cancellations, espe-
cially those attributed to weather or air traffic control issues, the
airline industry was increasingly on the defensive as Congress’
displeasure with the industry continued to mount.
27%
23%
18% 18%
22% 23%
25%
27%
24%
21% 20% 20%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 1
Numerous government reports and Congressional hearings
highlighted concerns by policymakers on the need to address cer-
tain airline customer service issues.31  There were at least three
bills introduced in the U.S. Senate during the 107th Congress
(2001–02) which addressed airline passenger protection issues.32
Six bills were introduced in the House of Representatives dealing
with airline passenger protection issues during that same session
of Congress.33
Senator Ron Wyden (D.-Ore.) introduced the Fair Treatment of
Airline Passengers Act in 2001 which would have imposed a se-
ries of new obligations on carriers to inform passengers about
delayed, canceled, or diverted flights.34  The bill also required the
DOT to “establish minimum standards, compliance which can be
measured quantitatively, of air carrier performance with respect
to customer service issues addressed by” regulations or the indus-
try’s obligations as set forth in its Commitment.35
31 Report Is Expected to Outline Persistent Airline Problems, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2001, at A17; OIG FINAL REPORT 2001, supra note 26.
32 S. 200, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); S. 319, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001);
S. 483, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
33 H.R. 384, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); H.R. 571, 107th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2001); H.R. 907, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); H.R. 1407, 107th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2001); H.R. 1734, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); H.R. 1792, 107th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
34 S. 483, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (2001). See Airlines Fail to Ease the
Distress of Flight Delays, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A18.
35 S. 483, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(2)(c) (2001).
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Senator John McCain (R.-Ariz.) introduced a bill proposing the
Airline Customer Service Improvement Act.36  The proposal
would direct the Secretary of Transportation to allocate addi-
tional resources towards “airline passenger consumer protection
and related services.”37  A similar bill was introduced by Rep. J.T.
Watts (R.-Okla.) in the House of Representatives.38
Despite the concern raised by an increasing number of mem-
bers of Congress, no legislation to address passenger protection
legislation was passed in 2001.  With the tragic events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 and the economic challenges facing the airline indus-
try during that time, the Congress turned its attention to airline
security and ensuring the financial viability of the U.S. airline
industry.39
III. The Tipping Points That Called for the Government to
Take Action
The years 2006 and 2007 marked the tipping point for flight
delays and cancellations.  More than 25 percent of all flights were
delayed during the summers of 2006 and 2007, with an average
delay length of over 55 minutes.40  Furthermore, the DOT’s Air
Travel Consumer Reports noted a 65 percent increase in passen-
ger complaints over the same time period in 2006.41
Two well-publicized incidents during peak travel periods in
December 2006 and February 2007 heightened the level of con-
cern about the airline industry’s ability to properly address long
on-board delays, a subset of overall delays.  On December 29,
36 S. 319, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
37 Id. § 3(a)(1).
38 H.R. 1792, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
39 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-171T, COMMERCIAL AVI-
ATION: FINANCIAL CONDITION AND INDUSTRY RESPONSES AFFECT COM-
PETITION (2002).  Between 2000 and 2002, the industry experienced a
revenue decline of 24 percent.  The industry lost more than six billion dol-
lars in 2001.
40 OIG STATUS REPORT 2008, supra note 6.  Under 14 C.F.R. § 234.2 (DOT
regulations), a flight is considered delayed when it arrives 15 or more min-
utes after its scheduled arrival time.  Summer months include June, July,
and August.
41 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ACTIONS NEEDED TO
IMPROVE AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE (2007) [hereinafter OIG AIRLINE
CUSTOMER SERVICE STATEMENT], available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/
sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/WEB_FILE_CC2007046_Airline_Customer_Ser
vice_Statement.pdf.
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2006, American Airlines was forced to divert 130 aircraft to other
airports due to a storm that necessitated the closing of the Dallas/
Fort Worth International Airport.42  Over one-third of those air-
craft sat on airport tarmacs for more than four hours.43
Less than two months later, JetBlue Airways experienced a
similar fate when 12 of its aircraft sat on John F. Kennedy Inter-
national Airport’s tarmac for more than four hours due to a win-
ter snow storm in New York.44  Nine additional aircraft were held
on the tarmac for more than six hours.45  In all, more than 1,000
passengers were affected.46
To its credit, JetBlue and several other carriers took immediate
action to enact a Customer Bill of Rights.  JetBlue’s policy set
forth guidelines as to when it would provide monetary credits to
its passengers for delays due to controllable irregularities.47  This
appeared to be a proactive approach by the industry to thwart
government action once again.48
At the time, both states and the federal government were inter-
ested in enacting legislation that would protect passengers af-
fected by delays, especially those passengers on aircraft that are
delayed on the tarmac.  States use their police powers to enact
laws that address health and safety issues.49  Some states felt that
a law requiring airlines to accommodate passengers who were ex-
periencing long delays on flights fell within the scope of a state’s
police powers to address health issues.50
42 J. Bailey, Airlines Work on Systems to Reduce Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2007, at C1.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Editorial, The Politics of JetBlue, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 27, 2007, at 11.
46 OIG AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE STATEMENT, supra note 41.
47 JETBLUE AIRWAYS’ CUSTOMER BILL OF RIGHTS, http://www.jetblue.
com/p/about/ourcompany/promise/Bill_Of_Rights.pdf (last visited June 4,
2013).
48 Alexandra Marks, JetBlue Woes Spur Call for Fliers’ Bill of Rights; Long
Waits for Passengers Caused by Last Week’s Ice Storm in New York Have
Prompted Talk of Customer-Service Regulation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Feb. 20, 2007, at 2.
49 Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 528 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65 (N.D.N.Y.
2007), rev’d, 520 F.3d 218 (2d. Cir. 2008). See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996).
50 See generally Ani B. Satz, The Limits of Health Care Reform, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 1451, 1460 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X; Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (“[Police] powers, broadly stated and without, at
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When the U.S. Congress, however, enacted the ADA, it in-
cluded a provision that specifically barred states from “enacting
or enforcing any law . . . relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or
services.”51  Through a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
has explained the broad scope of this preemption clause.  In
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court stated that the
reason Congress included a preemption provision was “[t]o ensure
that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regula-
tion of their own.”52  Two years later, the Congress “endorsed the
holding in Morales” when it recodified the Airline Deregulation
Act.53
New York was the first state to enact a passenger bill of rights
law.54  New York’s law required airlines to provide their passen-
gers who were on a flight that was delayed more than three hours
with access to fresh cabin air and lights, bathrooms, food, and
water.55  Similar, but not identical, bills to New York’s law were
introduced in ten other states.56
The ATA, the U.S. airline industry trade group, brought suit in
federal court, claiming that the law was preempted by the Airline
Deregulation Act.57  The U.S. District Court held that the Passen-
ger Bill of Rights Act was not preempted because the New York
law specifically addressed “consumer health and safety issues,”
both of which were outside the scope of the federal Airline Der-
egulation Act.58
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court by ruling that New York State’s Passenger Bill of Rights
was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.  In its opinion,
present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public.”).
51 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1978).
52 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
53 Robert S. Span, Airline Passenger “Rights” Legislation, 22-1 AIR & SPACE
LAW. 5–8 (2008).
54 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 251-f to 251-j (Consol. 2007), invalidated by Air
Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2008).
55 Id.
56 Timothy J. Lynes, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Invalidates New York
Airline Passenger Bill of  Rights (June 18, 2008), http://www.kattenlaw.
com/files/21573_Lynes—ILO—Second_Circuit.pdf (citing Andrew
Garber, Passenger Rights Bill Gets a Push in State, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
23, 2008, at A1).
57 Air Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 528 F. Supp. 2d 62 (N.D.N.Y.
2007), rev’d, 520 F.3d 218 (2d. Cir. 2008).
58 Id. at 67.
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the Court held that “requiring airlines to provide food, water,
electricity, and restrooms to passengers during lengthy ground de-
lays does relate to the service of an air carrier and therefore falls
within the express terms of the ADA’s preemption provision.”59
Congress once again attempted to take action.  Senators Bar-
bara Boxer (D.-Cal.) and Olympia Snowe (R.-Me.) introduced the
Airline Passenger Bill of Rights Act of 2007.60  The bill required
airlines to provide passengers who were on a flight that had left
the gate and had still not departed, the right to “adequate food
and potable water” as well as bathroom facilities.61  Reps. James
Oberstar (D.-Minn.) and Jerry Costello (D.-Ill.) introduced a simi-
lar bill called the Air Service Improvement Act of 2008 in the
House of Representatives.62  Neither house of Congress was able
to get a bill passed.
The Executive Branch also tried to exert pressure on the indus-
try as a whole to take action.  In 2008, Secretary of Transporta-
tion Mary Peters created a Tarmac Delay Task Force to help
formulate some protections for passengers.  The group was com-
posed of 36 members of the aviation industry.63  But like the air-
line industry’s Commitment, the final report failed to impose any
binding obligations on carriers.
These two events highlighted ongoing problems with the air
transportation system.  The DOT’s Office of Inspector General
issued a report in 2008, stating that flight delays and cancellations
were still problem areas for the air transport system and contin-
ued to contribute to a high level of discontent among the traveling
public.64  The report also recognized that delays and cancellations
are caused by a number of factors, such as airline scheduling, air
traffic congestion, airport infrastructure, security, and weather-
related issues.65
59 Air Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 223.
60 S. 678, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007).
61 S. 678 §§ 41781(a)(1)(A)-(B), 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007).
62 H.R. 6355 § 42301(c)(2)(A)-(C), 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008).
63 Carol J. Williams, Trouble on Tarmac – Two Years After Post-Christmas
Delays Fiasco, Bill for Air Travelers’ Rights Remains Grounded, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 2008, at A10.
64 OIG STATUS REPORT 2008, supra note 6.
65 Id.
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A review of federal government data provides some insight into
the problem.  The chart examines airline operations in the United
States between June 2003 and June 2008.66
On-Time Arrival Performance
National (June, 2003 – June, 2008)
Number of % of Total Delayed % of Total
Operations Operations Minutes Delayed Minutes
Delayed 27,701,487 23.7% N/A N/A
Air Carrier Delay 2,151,153 5.9% 115,337,480 27.5%
Weather Delay 335,299 0.9% 24,867,003 5.9%
National Aviation 2,848,689 7.9% 128,868,633 30.8%System Delay
Security Delay 23,427 0.1% 866,102 0.2%
Aircraft Arriving Late 2,471,397 6.8% 149,105,974 35.6%
Cancelled 678,758 1.9% N/A N/A
Diverted 77,012 0.2% N/A N/A
Total Operations 36,287,218 — 419,045,192 100.0%
Figure 2
Air Carrier Delay is defined by the DOT as “[t]he causes of the
cancellation or delay was due to circumstances within the air-
line’s control.”67  The category Aircraft Arriving Late is defined as
“[a] previous flight with the same aircraft arrived late, causing the
present flight to depart late.”68  Those delays and cancellations
attributable to the National Aviation System “refer to a broad set
of conditions, such as non-extreme weather conditions, airport
operations, heavy traffic volume, and air traffic control.”69
Close to 24 percent of all U.S. airlines’ scheduled flights, over
6.5 million total flights, were delayed between 2003 and 2008.70
Only 5.9 percent of delayed flight operations were due to “circum-
stances within the airline’s control.”71  This percentage of flights,
however, was responsible for over 27.5 percent of the total
66 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Airline On-Time Statistics and Delay
Causes, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ot_delay/ot_delaycause1.asp (last
visited June 10, 2013).
67 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Understanding the Reporting of Causes of
Flight Delays and Cancellations, http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/help/avia-
tion/html/understanding.html (last visited June 10, 2013).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra notes 66 & 67.
33923-alp_13-1 Sheet No. 97 Side B      10/28/2013   11:22:08
33923-alp_13-1 Sheet No. 97 Side B      10/28/2013   11:22:08
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ALP\13-1\ALP102.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-OCT-13 9:48
190 Issues in Aviation Law and Policy [Vol. 13:1
delayed minutes.72  The industry was also partially responsible
for delays under the Aircraft Arriving Late category, which repre-
sented over one-third of the total delayed minutes.73
Nearly eight percent of all flights during this period were
delayed due to a National Aviation System issue.74  Yet the
delayed flights in this category were responsible for 30.8 percent
of the total delayed minutes during this period.75  The airline in-
dustry or the federal government, or in some cases both institu-
tions, were responsible for these types of delays.  For example, the
airline industry may have been responsible for scheduling too
many flights into or out of certain heavily congested airports,
such as New York’s LaGuardia and Newark’s Liberty Interna-
tional Airports.  In many cases, the FAA was also partially re-
sponsible for these types of delays because the agency has
primary responsibility for air traffic control and addressing
problems such as heavy air traffic volume.  The FAA has dedi-
cated resources to dealing with these issues through the develop-
ment of the next generation air traffic control system as well as
redesigning certain highly congested airspace corridors.76
The data reveal that the airline industry played a significant
role in contributing to flight delays.  The government, however,
also played a role in contributing to the delay problems.  Of
course, it is appropriate to consider what kind of impact a der-
egulated and highly competitive industry has on airline behavior.
One must also ask whether the highly competitive industry drives
carriers to be concerned with market share and frequency of
schedule over customer satisfaction as it pertains to flight cancel-
lations and delays.
72 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 66 (“A flight is considered delayed
when it arrived 15 or more minutes later than the schedule (see definitions
in Frequently Asked Questions).  Delayed minutes are calculated for
delayed flights only.  When multiple causes are assigned to one delayed
flight, each cause is prorated based on delayed minutes it is responsible
for.  The displayed numbers are rounded and may not add up to the to-
tal.”). Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 U.S. Fed. Aviation Admin., New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia Airspace
design, http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas_redesign/regional_guidance/
eastern_reg/nynjphl_redesign/ (last visited May 8, 2013).
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IV. The DOT Enacts New Regulations to Address Customer
Service Issues
In 2009, the DOT promulgated its first Enhancing Airline Pas-
senger Protections rule.77  The rule went into effect in April 2010.
With respect to addressing flight delays, the rule requires U.S.
airlines to:
• Adopt contingency plans for lengthy tarmac de-
lays that include provisions for adequate food
and water within 2 hours and deplaning of pas-
sengers within 3 hours;78
• Provide passengers with access to the aircraft’s
lavatory facilities;79
• Provide passengers with medical attention if
needed while the aircraft is on the tarmac;80
• Post contracts of carriage, contingency plans, and
customer service plans on their websites;81
• Publish information on flight delays on their
websites;82 and
• Adopt customer service plans and audit their
own compliance with their plans.83
77 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 14 C.F.R. § 259.2 (2012). See
U.S. Dept. of Transp., Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings,
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Enforcement of
the Final Rule on Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, Apr. 28, 2010,
available at http://airconsumer.dot.gov/rules/FAQ%20on%20Consumer%
20Rule%20April%2028%202010.pdf (last visited July 25, 2013).
78 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 14 C.F.R. § 259.4 (2013).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at § 259.6.  Today, both domestic and foreign air carriers that operated
scheduled passenger service or public charter service to or from the U.S.
with an aircraft with a capacity of 30 or more seats are required to adopt a
contingency plan which provides ten assurances that are specified at sec-
tion 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)(1)-(10).
82 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 14 C.F.R. § 259.6 (2013).
83 The rule also prohibits U.S. carriers from retroactively applying any ma-
terial amendment to their contracts of carriage that has significant nega-
tive implications for consumers. See U.S. Dept. of Transp., Office of
Aviation Enforcement & Proceedings, Answers to Frequently Asked
Questions Concerning the Enforcement of the Second Final Rule on En-
hancing Airline Passenger Protections (EAPP #2), issued August 19, 2011;
revised September 6, 2011, October 19, 2011, January 11, 2012, and June
15, 2012.
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In 2011, the DOT enacted its second Enhancing Airline Pas-
senger Protections rule, which expanded the scope of the rule to
cover international flights operated by both U.S. and foreign car-
riers operating into or out of the United States.84  Key provisions
of the rule include:
• Requiring foreign air carriers operating to or
from the U.S. with at least one aircraft with 30 or
more passenger seats to adopt and adhere to
tarmac delay contingency plans;85
• Requiring U.S. and foreign air carriers operating
an international flight to not remain on the
tarmac at a U.S. airport for more than four hours
without allowing passengers to deplane subject
to safety, security, and ATC exceptions;86
• Expanding the airports at which airlines must
adhere to the contingency plan terms to include
small hub and non-hub airports, including diver-
sion airports;87
• Requiring U.S. and foreign carriers to coordinate
plans with Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and the Transportation Security Adminis-
tration (TSA);88
• Requiring notification regarding the status of de-
lays every 30 minutes while aircraft is delayed,
including reasons for delay, if known;89 and
• Requiring notification of opportunity to deplane
from an aircraft that is at the gate or another dis-
embarkation area with door open, if the opportu-
nity to deplane actually exists.90
Section 259.4 is the most important and sometimes the most
controversial provision enacted by the DOT.  It was important
because it reflected a meaningful attempt by the DOT to finally
use its rulemaking power to address long on-board delays.  It
84 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 14 C.F.R. §§ 259.1–259.8. See
U.S. Dept. of Transp., Office of Aviation Enforcement & Proceedings,
supra note 83.
85 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 14 C.F.R. § 259.4.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at § 259.8.
90 Id. at § 259.4.
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was, however, controversial because the rule allows the DOT to
impose fines up to $27,500 per passenger whenever an aircraft sits
on the tarmac for more than three hours.91  If an airline operating
a Boeing 737 with 125 passengers on-board violates the rule, the
airline is subject to a fine of over $3.4 million.
A review of industry data reveals that the rule has been suc-
cessful in reducing three-hour tarmac delays.  In the 24 months
prior to the rule going into effect, there were 1,880 flights that
experienced tarmac delays of more than three hours.92  There
were just 18 affected flights in the 12 months after the rule took
effect.93
The chart below (fig. 3) highlights the positive impact that the
rule has made in reducing long on-board delays.94  The chart,
however, also highlights the fact that the enactment of the tarmac
91 14 C.F.R. § 383.2(a) (2013).  In its rule, the DOT created exceptions for
the three- and four-hour tarmac limits:
(1) For domestic flights, assurance that the covered U.S. air car-
rier will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac for more
than three hours before allowing passengers to deplane unless:
(i) The pilot-in-command determines there is a safety-related or
security-related reason (e.g. weather, a directive from an appro-
priate government agency) why the aircraft cannot leave its posi-
tion on the tarmac to deplane passengers; or
(ii) Air traffic control advises the pilot-in-command that re-
turning to the gate or another disembarkation point elsewhere in
order to deplane passengers would significantly disrupt airport
operations.
(2) For international flights operated by covered carriers that
depart from or arrive at a U.S. airport, assurance that the carrier
will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac at a U.S.
airport for more than four hours before allowing passengers to
deplane, unless:
(i) The pilot-in-command determines there is a safety-related or
security-related reason why the aircraft cannot leave its position
on the tarmac to deplane passengers; or
(ii) Air traffic control advises the pilot-in-command that re-
turning to the gate or another disembarkation point elsewhere in
order to deplane passengers would significantly disrupt airport
operations.
14 C.F.R. § 259.4.
92 Amy Cohn, A Year Later, Tarmac-Delay Rules Needs Some Maintenance,
BUS. TRAVEL NEWS, Aug. 22, 2011, at 54.
93 Id.
94 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Tarmac Times and Cancellation Rates, http://
www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_areas/airline_infor
mation/taxi_out_and_other_tarmac_times/index.html (last visited June
10, 2013).
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rule has resulted in an increase in the cancellation rate for flights.
In a 2011 report, the Government Accountability Office noted
that “[t]otal cancellations as a percentage of all flights increased
from 1 percent in 2009 to 1.2 percent in 2010.”95
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Figure 3
The tarmac rules also appear to have accentuated the effect of
flight delays and cancellations on rural communities in the U.S.
Flights to or from smaller and more rural airports tend to have
higher rates of delays, cancellations, and diversions.96  Flights
from rural airports are 3.5 times more likely to be canceled or
diverted when compared with flights from larger cities.97  This
means that trip times for passengers traveling to or from these
smaller airports can be much longer than for passengers depart-
ing to, or arriving from, larger airports.98
The effect of the tarmac rule also raises questions regarding
passenger preferences when they are faced with the dilemma of a
longer than expected trip time, versus the outright cancellation of
their trip.  For many passengers, their “highest priority is not be
95 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-733, AIRLINE PASSEN-
GER PROTECTIONS: MORE DATA AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO UNDER-
STAND EFFECTS OF FLIGHT DELAYS (2011).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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on the plane for an extended period of time.”99  Indeed, the rule
has been very good at addressing the needs of that segment of the
traveling public.
There are also passengers who, if given the choice, would pre-
fer to avoid sitting on a plane waiting for more than three hours
before taking off.  Those passengers, however, may prefer that
option over having their flight canceled because their airline does
not want to violate the tarmac rule.  This is a particularly sensi-
tive issue for passengers who are flying during peak travel peri-
ods.  If an airline cancels its flight, passengers may be faced with
the prospect of waiting for an extended period of time because the
airline is unable to accommodate them on other flights that are
also full.100
The DOT publishes a monthly report designed to assist con-
sumers with information on the quality of services provided by
U.S. and foreign carriers serving the United States.  The DOT
uses the submissions to “determine the extent to which carriers
are in compliance with federal aviation consumer protection reg-
ulations.”101  This data can also serve as a basis for DOT to pro-
pose new regulations in order to address certain problems in the
airline industry.102
The DOT classifies the complaints registered with the Depart-
ment in various ways including by type and airline.103  One way
of examining the possible impact of the new DOT regulations is
to consider the changes in the rate of passenger complaints before
and after the rules were enacted.  The chart below (fig. 4) com-
pares the rate of passenger complaints submitted on a monthly
basis from April 2007 through March 2008, versus April 2011
through March 2012.104  Except for the month of May, the pas-
senger complaint rates decreased each month after the rules went
into effect.
99 Cohn, supra note 92, at 54.
100 Id.
101 U.S. Dept. of Transp., Air Travel Consumer Reports, June 2011–May
2012 Reports, Table 6, available at http://www.dot.gov/airconsumer/air-
travel-consumer-reports.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
33923-alp_13-1 Sheet No. 100 Side B      10/28/2013   11:22:08
33923-alp_13-1 Sheet No. 100 Side B      10/28/2013   11:22:08
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ALP\13-1\ALP102.txt unknown Seq: 20 28-OCT-13 9:48
196 Issues in Aviation Law and Policy [Vol. 13:1
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
Ap
ril
M
ay
Ju
ne
Ju
ly
Au
gu
st
Se
pt
em
be
r
Oc
to
be
r
N
ov
em
be
r
De
ce
m
be
r
Ja
nu
ar
y
Fe
br
ua
ry
M
ar
ch
Ye
ar
-T
ot
al
C
om
p
la
in
ts
C
om
p
la
in
ts
April 2007-March 2008
April 2011-March 2012
Figure 4
Of course, the tarmac rules represent a subset of all new DOT
customer service rules now in effect.  The changes, however, sug-
gest that the rules may be having a positive impact.  The travel-
ing public, policymakers, and industry stakeholders have a vested
interest in making sure that the rules improve customer service.
Whether the rules achieve DOT’s objective remains to be seen.
What is clear, however, is that the tarmac rule has reduced long
on-board delays.
V. DOT’s Enforcement Case of the Tarmac Rule Highlights the
Complexity of Airline Operations and the Department’s
Commitment to Address Long On-Board Delays
One way of measuring the effectiveness of the tarmac rule is to
look at the number of cases that the DOT has brought against
carriers for violating the regulations.  To date, the DOT has
brought fewer than ten cases against carriers.  Of course, the po-
tential of a fine greater than $1 million in some cases may incen-
tivize carriers to follow the rules.
The cases below illustrate how the DOT enforces its rules.  It
appears that the DOT is holding all airlines accountable for ad-
herence to the regulations, as well as to the commitments the air-
lines set forth in their contingency plans.  The DOT also appears
to be more concerned with making sure that airlines follow the
rules than with imposing large fines.  As the cases below reveal,
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airlines have a chance to reduce their monetary penalties by tak-
ing corrective actions that avoid future violations of the DOT
regulations.
A. Tarmac Rule Violations
The DOT brought an enforcement action against American
Eagle Airlines in 2011 as a result of the carrier having 15 inbound
flights at Chicago O’Hare International Airport that were parked
on the tarmac for more than three hours on May 29, 2011.105  In
total, 608 passengers were on those affected flights.106
Throughout much of the day in question, the weather condi-
tions forced air traffic control to implement ground stops as well
as arrival delays and gate holds at the airport.107  The ramp re-
opened during the afternoon, but American Eagle did not have
enough gates to accommodate its arriving flights.  Consequently,
the carrier’s aircraft were forced to “hold at various waiting areas
around the airfield.”108
The DOT’s Consent Order stated that American Eagle had a
“Drop and Go” procedure which allows aircraft to be brought
into a gate so that passengers can disembark.  The aircraft are
immediately returned to a holding area until the congestion issues
have been resolved.109  The airline, however, did not execute its
plan very well.  According to the Consent Order:
American Eagle’s overly optimistic estimation of
its ability to handle the number of flights it chose to
operate into ORD and its poor planning of its crew
and gate resources caused 608 passengers to remain
on aircraft in excess of three hours without the op-
portunity to deplane.  Furthermore, the Enforce-
ment Office also believes that American Eagle’s
failure to implement in a timely manner its “Drop
and Go” procedure, and its failure early in the inci-
dent to request assistance deplaning passengers re-
motely by bus from the Chicago Department of
105 American Eagle Airlines, Inc., OST-2011-0003, Consent Order No. 2011-
11-13 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 14, 2011).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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Aviation, contributed significantly to the carrier’s
inability to deplane the 15 flights by the three-hour
mark.110
The DOT settled its enforcement matter with American Eagle
Airlines for $900,000.111  This represents the first and largest fine
to date against any carrier for a tarmac rule violation.  The settle-
ment amount is much lower than the $16.7 million fine the DOT
could have levied against the carrier.  It appears that the DOT
felt that a reduced fine was appropriate because “the average pas-
senger delay was [only] 18 minutes beyond the three-hour
limit.”112
This case underscores the complexity of airline operations and
how poor decision-making can impact airline passengers.  To its
credit, American Eagle informed the DOT that as a result of this
incident, it “conducted additional training of its employees, with a
particular focus on flights destined to ORD on days involving in-
clement weather.”113  This is particularly important because the
carrier and its mainline partner both have hubs at this airport.
Because of the high level of congestion at this airport and because
inclement weather is common to the Chicago area, it is very likely
that this situation could occur again.
The first case against a carrier for violating the tarmac rule, as
it applies to international flights, was brought against Pakistan
International Airlines Corporation (PIA).  The DOT alleged that
PIA violated 14 C.F.R. § 259.4 and 49 U.S.C. § 41712 by al-
lowing one of its flights to “remain on the tarmac at Washington
Dulles International Airport on October 29, 2011, for more than
four hours without the opportunity to deplane.”114  DOT also al-
leged that PIA failed to “adhere to the assurances in its contin-
gency plan for lengthy tarmac delays that the carrier would not
permit an international flight to remain on the tarmac for more
110 Id.
111 Id.  In the consent order, DOT stated that after it paid the first $650,000,
American Eagle would be credited up to $250,000 for vouchers, frequent
flyer mileage, and cash funds given to passengers.
112 Doug Cameron, U.S. Levies First Tarmac-Delay Fine, WALL ST. J., Nov.
15, 2007, at B2.
113 American Eagle Airlines, Inc., OST-2011-0003 (consent order), supra note
105.
114 Pakistan Int’l Airlines Corp., OST-2012-0002, Consent Order No. 2011-
11-13 (Dep’t of Transp. Sep. 19, 2012).
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than four hours without providing passengers an opportunity to
deplane.”115
PIA flight 711 from Manchester, England to New York was
scheduled to arrive at John F. Kennedy International Airport
(JFK) at 3:27 pm on October 29, 2011.116  A “winter weather
event” in the Northeastern portion of the U.S. was creating air-
port delays.117  The instrument landing system, which is often uti-
lized, especially during inclement weather, was not working at
JFK, thus making it impossible for PIA’s flight to land.118  The
captain of flight 711 subsequently tried to land at Boston’s Logan
International Airport (BOS), PIA’s principal diversion airport in
the Northeast.119  His request was denied due to the large volume
of additional flights arriving at the airport.120
PIA’s flight had a limited amount of fuel and was diverted to
Washington’s Dulles International Airport (IAD).121  The aircraft
landed at 4:28 p.m. and parked at a remote stand.122  The air-
craft’s captain and first officer disembarked the aircraft via air
stairs in order to conduct external safety inspections.123  PIA
made no attempts to allow passengers to disembark, nor did it
make contact with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol about the
possibility of allowing its passengers to go through customs.124
The flight was delayed on the tarmac for four hours and forty-
seven minutes.125
In mitigation, PIA stated that its tarmac delay issue was “exac-
erbated by several regrettable events outside the airline’s direct
control” such as the instrument landing system problems at JFK
and having to land at IAD which was not its principal diversion
airport.126  PIA further claimed that allowing passengers to dis-
embark via the air stairs may have been “unsuitable due to the
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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inclement weather, as well as the number of passengers requiring
wheelchairs and the number of small children on board.”127
DOT didn’t find PIA’s reasons to be compelling.  DOT stated
that, in fact, IAD served as a regular diversion airport for PIA.128
The carrier also provided a copy of its tarmac delay plan to the
Customs and Border Patrol, Transportation Security Administra-
tion, and “the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority offi-
cials at IAD on August 23, 2011, in an effort to coordinate the
carrier’s plan with those entities.”129  This suggests that PIA was
indeed prepared to use IAD as a diversion airport and therefore,
it should have been able to allow its passengers to disembark
within the four hour time limit.
PIA and DOT entered into a settlement whereby the carrier
agreed to a civil penalty of $150,000.130  DOT agreed to forego
collection of half the total penalty if PIA did not commit any fur-
ther violations of 14 C.F.R. § 259.4 and 49 U.S.C. § 41712 before
November 1, 2014.131
DOT’s case against Copa Airlines, Inc. illustrates another set
of conditions which highlights the complexity of airline opera-
tions: limits on flight crew hours.132  Copa’s flight 831 was sched-
uled to depart New York’s John F. Kennedy International
Airport (JFK) at 3:05 p.m. for Panama Tocumen International
Airport (PTY) on June 22, 2012.133  Poor weather conditions at
JFK resulted in delayed departure at the airport that afternoon.
Copa’s flight left the gate at 3:50 p.m.134
While waiting for the weather to improve, Copa’s flight crew
began serving beverages at 4:50 p.m.135  Forty minutes later, the
flight’s captain relocated the aircraft to a remote area on the
tarmac in order to refuel the aircraft.136  Refueling was completed
at 6:45 p.m. and the aircraft once again waited on the taxiway for
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Copa Airlines, Inc., OST-2012-0002, Consent Order No. 2012-12-18
(Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 31, 2012).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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departure instructions.137  Passengers were offered meals at 7:30
p.m. while the aircraft continued to wait for further
instructions.138
Copa’s flight crew was nearing the limit on its work duty
times.  The captain decided to postpone the flight and passengers
disembarked at 9:24 p.m., some five hours and thirty-four min-
utes after the aircraft left the gate.139
The DOT charged Copa with violating 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)(2)
for failing to “adhere to the assurances in its contingency plan for
lengthy tarmac delays that the carrier would not permit an air-
craft to remain on the tarmac at a U.S. airport for more than four
hours without providing passengers an opportunity to
deplane.”140  Copa was also charged with failing to adhere to its
contingency play to provide “food no later than two hours after
the aircraft left the gate in the case of departure.”141
In the consent order, DOT noted that Copa failed to comply
with the regulatory requirements regarding the necessary con-
tents for its contingency plan.142  The carrier noted that its crew
“acted in a very courteous and professional manner” and that it
provided its passengers with meal vouchers and ground transpor-
tation after it canceled the flight.143  Copa conceded to the DOT
that it “failed to strictly comply with the requirements.”144  The
carrier also noted the steps it took in order to address the issues.
This included updating its flight crew operations and procedure
manuals as well as its website in order to comply with DOT
regulations.145
DOT assessed Copa $150,000 in civil penalties.146  Half of the
fine, however, did not have to be paid by Copa if it adhered to the
consent order’s cease and desist provisions for a total of one
year.147
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.  Copa also conceded that it had failed to timely file the tarmac delay
report with the DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
145 Copa Airlines, Inc., OST-2012-0002 (consent order), supra note 132.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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B. Proceedings Against Carriers Who Fail to Inform
Passengers That They Have a Right to Disembark
When the Flight is at the Gate and the
Aircraft Door is Open
The DOT pursued a case against JetBlue Airways in 2012 for
two violations, neither of which was a traditional tarmac delay.148
The case is important because it illustrates the obligations im-
posed on carriers who operate a delayed flight that has neither
left the gate nor closed the aircraft door.  In this case, JetBlue was
operating a flight from New York’s John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport (JFK) to San Francisco International Airport
(SFO) on March 3, 2012.149  The flight was scheduled to depart
JFK at 7:30 p.m. and boarding began at 7:06 p.m.150  A mechani-
cal issue and the accommodation of military personnel required
the flight to be delayed until 9:55 p.m.151
14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)(6) states:
For all flights, assurance that the passengers on
the delayed flight will be notified beginning 30
minutes after scheduled departure time (including
any revised departure time that passengers were
notified about before boarding) and every 30 min-
utes thereafter that they have the opportunity to
deplane from an aircraft that is at the gate or an-
other disembarkation area with the door open if the
opportunity to deplane actually exists . . . .152
The DOT stated that the carrier had violated 14 C.F.R.
§ 259.4(b)(6) because it failed to “properly notify passengers that
they had the opportunity to deplane the aircraft that was at the
gate for a lengthy period of time with the door open.”153  DOT
stated that “[a] tarmac delay begins when passengers no longer
have the option to get off an aircraft, which usually occurs when
the doors of the aircraft are closed.”154
148 JetBlue Airways Corp., OST-2012-0002, Consent Order No. 2012-8-25
(Dep’t of Transp. Aug. 20, 2012).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 14 C.F.R. § 259.4.
153 Id.
154 JetBlue Airways Corp., OST-2012-0002 (consent order), supra note 148.
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JetBlue conceded that its crew failed to inform passengers that
they had the right to deplane the aircraft.155  The airline argued,
however, that the aircraft door was open throughout the entire
delay and passengers could have deplaned at any time.156  DOT
rejected the carrier’s argument by explaining that that Section
259.4(b)(6) “was promulgated to address the issue of when a
tarmac delay has not yet begun, because the doors remain open at
a gate or another disembarkation area, and yet passengers are
unaware that the door to the aircraft is open and that they have
the option to deplane, particularly during a departure delay at the
gate or on an aircraft where passenger [sic] would not know that
the door was open and deplaning.”157
JetBlue was also charged with violating 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)
for not including all of the “required assurances in its contingency
plan for lengthy tarmac delays.”158  The DOT noted that both vi-
olations also constituted engagement in “unfair and deceptive
practice” under 49 U.S.C. § 41712.159  Although DOT and JetBlue
agreed that the carrier would pay a fine of $90,000, the language
in the order noted that the carrier would only be responsible for
half of that amount provided that the carrier did not violate 14
C.F.R. § 259.4 and 49 U.S.C. § 41712 for one year from the date
of the order.160  The inclusion of this type of condition has also
been found in other orders that the Department has entered into
with other carriers.  It also reflects the DOT’s desire to penalize
parties for violations but also to provide them with some finan-
cial incentive to rectify their noncompliance with the Depart-
ment’s regulations.
The DOT’s case against Virgin America is similar to the Jet-
Blue matter.  Virgin America was scheduled to operate a flight
between Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) and San
Francisco International Airport (SFO) on July 18, 2012 at 8:20
p.m.161  Boarding for the flight commenced 50 minutes late be-
cause the inbound aircraft arrived late into Chicago.162  With all
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Virgin America Inc., OST-2012-0002, Consent Order No. 2012-12-20
(Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 31, 2012).
162 Id.
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passengers aboard the aircraft, the flight was delayed once again
due to weather.163  During this gate delay of more than two hours,
“passengers remained on board the aircraft with the door to the
aircraft open and the jet bridge attached.”164
The DOT charged Virgin America with violating 14 C.F.R.
§ 259.4(b)(6) by failing to properly notify passengers that they had
the opportunity to deplane the aircraft that was at the gate for a
lengthy period with the door open.165  The Department also al-
leged that the carrier’s regulatory violation resulted in the carrier
engaging in “unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods
of competition in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 41712.”166  The DOT set
forth its findings in the order:
In sum, section 259.4(b)(6) is in place to address
the precise incident that occurred on flight 211.  Be-
ginning thirty minutes after the revised scheduled
departure time and every thirty minutes thereafter
until the doors closed, Virgin America was required
to notify passengers that they could deplane the air-
craft if they wished to do so.  The failure by Virgin
America to make the proper notifications is a viola-
tion of 14 CFR 259.4(b)(6) as well as 49 U.S.C.
§ 41712.167
The DOT and Virgin America entered into a settlement
whereby the carrier was fined $55,000.168  As in the JetBlue case,
the agency agreed to allow Virgin America to avoid paying half of
its fine if the carrier complied with the order’s cease and desist as
well as the payment provisions.169
The DOT pursued a similar matter against United Air Lines in
2013.  United’s flight 881 from Chicago O’Hare International
Airport (ORD) to Narita International Airport (NRT) in Tokyo
left the gate at 12:38 p.m. on May 7, 2012.170  The flight never left
the airport.  The aircraft returned to a gate at 2:25 p.m. in order
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 United Air Lines, Inc., OST-2013-0004, Consent Order No. 2013-2-9
(Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 11, 2013).
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to address a maintenance issue.171  The aircraft’s doors were
opened at the gate, but United failed to make an announcement
notifying passengers that they had the right to deplane.172  At 3:10
p.m., the aircraft’s doors were closed.173  Soon after, another
mechanical issue arose and the flight was subsequently canceled
and passengers deplaned the aircraft.174
The DOT alleged that United had violated 14 C.F.R.
§ 259.4(b)(6) and 49 U.S.C. § 41712 by “failing to properly notify
passengers that they had the opportunity to deplane the aircraft
that was at the gate with the door open.”175  United was also
charged with failing to accurately report tarmac delay informa-
tion to the DOT in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 244.3 and 49 U.S.C.
§ 41708.176
United told the DOT that a “miscommunication resulted in the
failure to make a deplaning announcement after the flight re-
turned to the gate and the opportunity to deplane existed.”177  The
carrier stated, however, that it “failed to make the announcement
mandated by section 259.4(b)(6) only once” and “it did not have
any knowledge about any passenger requesting to leave the air-
craft while it was at the gate with the door open.”178  The DOT
stated in part:
Beginning thirty minutes after the flight returned
to the gate in which the opportunity to deplane ex-
isted and every thirty minutes thereafter until the
doors closed United was required to notify passen-
gers that they could deplane the aircraft if they
wished to do so.  The failure by United to make the
proper notification is a violation of 14 CFR
259.4(b)(6) as well as 49 U.S.C. § 41712.179
In the order, DOT stated that carriers have an obligation to
inform their passengers that they have the option to deplane
when the aircraft is parked at the gate and its door(s) is open.180
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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The DOT also stated that airline should “remind passengers that
they are deplaning at their own risk and that the flight could de-
part at any time without them if that is in fact the case.”181  This
is particularly important for a situation that involves an interna-
tional flight.  By failing to return on time to board an interna-
tional flight, passengers may find it very difficult to reach their
destination in a timely manner and incur additional expenses.
In its settlement with United, DOT assessed the carrier
$130,000 in civil penalties.182  After paying the first $40,000,
United was credited up to $40,000 for refunds, travel vouchers,
and frequent flyer mileage awards given to passengers on flight
881.183  Consistent with its action in previous cases, the DOT
agreed to forego the remaining $50,000 that United owed the De-
partment if the carrier complied with the order’s cease and desist
provisions.184
C. The Need to Follow the Rules
The DOT brought a case against Air India in 2012 for its fail-
ure to post its tarmac delay contingency and customer service
plans, pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §§ 259.4 and 259.6(a), on its website
by August 23, 2011, the date the second set of rules went into
effect.185  The DOT also charged Air India with failing to “dis-
close on the homepage of their website a clear and conspicuous
hyperlink that takes the viewer directly to a page . . . where all
fees for optional services” are disclosed.186  The DOT noted that
these actions constitute engagement in “unfair and deceptive
practices and unfair methods of competition in violation of 49
U.S.C. § 41712.”187
In its settlement with the DOT, Air India agreed to a fine of
$80,000, with half of that amount not subject to payment if the
carrier complied with the consent order’s cease and desist and
payment provisions for at least one year.188
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Air India, Ltd., OST-2012-0002, Consent Order No. 2012-5-4 (Dep’t of
Transp. May 3, 2012).
186 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 399.85(d).
187 Air India, Ltd., OST-2012-0002 (consent order), supra note 185.
188 Id.
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Conclusion
The federal government can play a meaningful role in address-
ing deficiencies in the airline industry.  As the enforcement of the
tarmac rule has demonstrated, solutions for a complex industry
are not always perfect.  Time will tell if these new regulations
have improved the much-loved deregulated airline industry.
Nonetheless, the cases discussed in this article suggest that the
DOT has been aggressive in trying to ensure that air carriers ad-
here to the regulatory requirements for addressing long flight de-
lays.  Both the cases and the quantitative data suggests that the
DOT’s rulemaking and enforcement powers have been quite suc-
cessful in ensuring that passengers’ needs are addressed during
long delays.  Policymakers will be watching to see whether air-
lines and their passengers experience improvements in customer
service.
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